Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1977

Francis R. Purdie v. The University of Utah et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Brian M. Barnard; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Brinton R. Burbidge; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents;
Michael Shepard; Attorney for Amici Curiae;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Purdie v. University of Utah, No. 15209 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/655

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FRANCES R. PURDIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY of the University of
Utah, CLAUDE W. GRANT, JOSEPH
C. BENTLEY, ROBERT E. FINLEY,
ADELAIDE FUHRIMAN, REED M.
MERRILL, RALPH E. PACKARD,
JAMES P. PAPPAS, MICHAEL J.
PATTON, and JOHN DOES I through
VII,

Case No. U25
. . 1;•
:•

•'

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF

RESPOIN'DEN't~.
:
.{.

AN APPEAL FROM TIIE DECISION
ORDER OF DIS~ISSAL . :
IN THE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIOf·~!OllTi'
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST
THE HONORABLE, DEAN E. CONDER,
T ..,· ....,.., ...

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

BRINTON R. 'R.f11.lUlnn:fl.'llf
Assistant Attorn·I!Y GeQelr$1
236 State Capitol HlliU.Il'llll!r'
Salt Lake City,
Attorney for Defein<liamte-JI\e~mfi~lti

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FRANCES R. PURDIE,
Plaintiff -Appellant,
(
\

vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY of the
University of Utah, CLAUDE W.
GRANT, JOSEPH C. BENTLEY,
ROBERT E. FlNLEY, ADELAIDE
FUHRIMAN, REED M. MERRILL,
RALPH E. PACKARD, JAMES P.
PAPPAS, MICHAEL J. PATTON,
and JOHN DOES I through VII,

Case No. 15209

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

A BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE
DECISION AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE, DEAN E.
CONDER, JUDGE PRESIDING

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF TIIE CASE • . . . .
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL .
STATEMENT OF FACTS .
ARGUMENT . . . . . • • .

Point I
THE USE OF AGE AS A DETERMINANT FOR
ADMISSION TO A GRADUATE LEVEL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AS
GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS • • • • . • • • • • •

A. Age is not a suspect classification •
B. Admission to a graduate level educational program is not a fundamental
interest . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • • .

10

Point II
GIVEN THE LIMITED RESOURCE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, IT WAS RATIONAL AND PROPER
FOR TIIE RESPONDENTS TO ALLOCATE THIS
RESOURCE ON THE BASIS OF AGE
CONCLUSION . • . • . . • • • . . . • . . •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
18

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Beard v. Board of Education North Summit
Sch(;(;l District, et al, 81 utah 51, 16 P. 2d
900(1932) . . . . • . • • • . • • . . • • . •

... ......

14, 16

Coleman v. Dept. of Employment Security
Board of Review, 29 Utah 2d 326, 509 P. 2d
355 (1973) • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • •

........

8

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90
S.Ct, 1153, 25L.Ed. 2d491(1970) • • • •

6

Everhart v. Knebel, 424 F. Supp. 390 (D.
Conn. 1976) . • •
• ••••

9

Garent v. Brown, 341 F. Supp. 1187, (S.D.
Ohio, 1972) aff'g mem 409 U.S. 89 • • . •

10

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91
S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971) •••

6

Human Rights Party v. Secretary of State,
370 F. Supp. 921 aff'g mem 414 U.S. 1058

10

Logan City School Dist. v. Kowallis, 94
Utah 342, 77 P. 2d 348 (1938) • • • •

12

Massachusetts Board of Retirement, et al
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562,
49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976) • . • • • • • • • • •

7

Maste v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 427 F.
Supp, 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976) . • . • .

9

McClure v. Board of Education, 38 Cal.
App, 500, 176 P. 711 . • • • • • • · •

• • • • • • • • • •

15

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81
S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961) . .
. · · · · · · · • •

6, 16

ii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

McLaughton v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L, Ed, 2d 222 (1964)
McLeod v. State ex rel Colmer, 154
Miss 468, 122 So. 737, 63 i\LR 1161.

•

It

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

. .......... ..

15

..... .......

12

Montana v. School District #1 of Fergus
County, 348 P. 2d 797 (Mont. 1960) . . •

...........

10

Northrop, et al v. City of Richmond, 105
335, 53 S.E. 962 (1906), . . . • . .

. . .. . . . . . . . .

13

Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So.
140 ( 1890) • • • • . . • . .

Ogama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68
S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948) . • . . •

........ . ...

San Antonio Independent School District

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278,
36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973)

•.•.•••.•••

6, 10

Schmidt v. Blair, 203 Iowa 1016, 213 N. W.
593 • . • • •- .-. • . • • • • . . . . . • • • •

15

Security National Bank v. Bagley, 202 Iowa
701, 210 N. W. 947, 49 ALR 705 . . . . . .

Jj

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct.
1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 . • • • • • • . . . . , •

11

State ex rel Slinkard, et al v. Grebe, 249 S. W.
2d 468 (Mo. 1952) . • • • • • -.-.•..•...
Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 34 S. Ct. 681,
58 L.Ed. 1129 (1914) . . . • . • . • • • • . •
Taxpayers Association of Weymouth Township,
Inc. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364
A. 2d 1016 (1976) • . . . . . . . .
iii
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7,
6QL":""Ed. 13i(1915) • . • • • . • . . • .
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778, 82 L. Ed. 1234
(1938) • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • .

. .. .......

14

..... ....

8

Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 406
U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768
(1972) • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • •

6

Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (SONY 1971),
46TF.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied 409
u.s. 1129 (1973) • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • •

17

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
Constitution of Utah
Article I
§1
s2

11
11
11
11

§6
§7

Article III

11. 12
11

Paragraph 4 •
Article IV
Article X

11, 12
11

§1
§31.
Article XVI
§3

•

.. .. .. .......... ..

Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Title 3 5-4-1 et seq.
Utah Code Annotated (1953)
s53-48-15 (5)

12

. • . • . . • ..•

8

...... ............

16

iv
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RULES

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

. ........ .

12 (b) (6) • • • • • • •

TREATISES

McQuillan, Municipal Corporation (2d Ed.) •

.. .. . ... . .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FRANCES R. PURDIE,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY of the
University of Utah, CLAUDE W.
GRANT, JOSEPH C. BENTLEY,
ROBERT E. FINLEY, ADELAIDE
FUHRllVIAN, REED M. MERRILL,
RALPH E. PACKARD, JAMES P.
PAPPAS, MICHAEL J. PATTON,
and JOHN DOES I through VII,

Case No. 15209

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Ms. Purdie, filed an action in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District in the County of Salt Lake alleging that defendants had
invidiously discriminated against her by denying her application for admittance
to the counseling psychology program of the Department of Educational Psychology as a Ph. D. candidate.

Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to prevent alleged discrimination solely on the basis of age in the defendants' admission procedures.

The defendants answered denying that ag e \,,,

the sole criteria by which the plaintiff's application had been denied, that:
plaintiff had failed to avail herself of the administrative remedies still ava
able to her, and that even if age had been used as a criterion for admissior
an educational program, it would be reasonable in light of the limited resc
ces available for educating persons in the field of Educational Psychology,
II

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
failed to state a cause of action, pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Utah Rut.
of Civil Procedure.

Upon stipulation of the parties, the factual allegation:

the plaintiff's complaint was deemed admitted for the purpose of the Motio·
Dismiss.

The parties agreed that graduate education in Educational Psyci

ogy is a limited resource.

The District Court held that "age" can be a fac

in decisions such as admission to a graduate program and the use of this!
is not a denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution. Ther
tiff appealed the dismissal of the complaint.
III

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents seek to have the decision of the lower coL
upheld.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IV

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1975, the plaintiff applied for admission to the Educational Psychology program as a Ph. D. candidate.

At that time, she was 51 years old

and had previously received a Bachelor's degree in Psychology/Sociology
and also a Master's degree in Social Work, from the University of Utah.

She

was a certified social worker.

At the time of her application, Claude W. Grant, Joseph C. Bentley,
Robert E. Finley, Adelaide Fuhriman, Reed M. Merrill, Ralph E. Packard,
James P. Pappas, and Michael J. Patton were members of the Admissions
Committee or faculty of the Department of Educational Psychology.

Because

of various conflicts, Ms. Fuhriman and 1\Iessrs. Grant and Packard did not
participate in the sessions which dealt with the plaintiff's application.

The

Admissions Committee and the faculty of the Department of Educational Psychology had the responsibility to review applications for admittance to the coonseling psychology program of the Department of Educational Psychology.
In the year that plaintiff applied, there were 125 applicants for 13 positions.

It is readily apparent, and the parties have stipulated, that positions in

the Ph. D. program in Educational Psychology constituted a limited resource.
The applicants were broken down into four groups according to appropriate admission test scores and cumulative gradepoint averages.

To provide a full,

rich educational program consisting of diverse views and attitudes, one-half of
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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available positions were allocated to out-of-state students.

In addition,

sixty per cent (60%) of the positions were allocated to persons holding ont,
bachelor degrees.

Forty per cent (40o/o) of the positions are allocated tor

sons holding masters degrees.

The plaintiff, being a resident of the state

holding a masters degree was, in all likelihood, considered for one of thr
positions in the program.
teen positions.

The plaintiff was not selected for one of the tbu

The reasons for her nonselection were not limited to age<

However, for the purposes of this appeal and the motion to dismiss in the.
court, the parties have stipulated that plaintiff's rejection was based onh,
The plaintiff made application again for the fall term of 1977. Att'
same time she filed the above-mentioned action in the Third Judicial Distr
Court requesling that the court declare that the policy and practice of the'.
versity of Utah, the Department of Educational Psychology, and all other:
defendants constituted discrimination against older applicants and was ac
of equal protection and due process.

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief fro:

practice in the future.
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on thegi
that it failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted. i
the purpose of that motion, and only for that purpose, the defendants stip'
that the allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint were true, that age·
used as a criterion for evaluation of applicants to various educational pro
of the University of Utah.
-4-
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The court be low rightly decided that age was a reasonable factor to
use in allocating this limited resource.

This decision was appealed.

v
ARGUMENT
POlNT I
THE USE OF AGE AS A DETERMINANT FOR ADMISSION
TO A GRADUATE LEVEL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AS GUARANTEED
BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
The United States Supreme Court has in several cases dealt with the
difficulty of drafting legislation and implementing those enactments which have
uniform operation with regard to all classes and individuals.

Neither langu-

age, nor man's ability to carry out the purpose behind the language. is exact
enough to affect only those persons for which the action was intended.

Recog-

nizing this, the Supreme Court has developed a two-tier approach to deal with
cases where plaintiffs have complained that their right to equal protection has
been trampled upon by the state.

According to this rationale. states are given

a wide latitude in formulating and effecting their policies. except where the
states touch upon what the court calls "suspect classifications" or "fundamental interests".

In those cases, the state action is examined with "struct judi-

cial scrutiny".

If, however, the classification does rot invade a fundamental

interest, or in some way touch upon a suspect classification, the court takes
a deferential view of the state action and a "rational basis" standard of review

-5-
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is used,

(See McGown v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Eo

2d 393, (1961); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 251
Ed. 2d 491 (1970).

In order for this court to view action by the Admission,

Commitee with "strict scrutiny", there must be present some suspect clas
ification, or a fundamental interest.

A.

In the instant case, there is neither,

Age is not a suspect classification.

The plaintiff claims that she was not allowed entry into the Ph.D. r
gram of the Department of Educational Psychology because of an alleged p:
of that department to deny entrance to older applicants.

Even if this were

such a classification would not, of itself, be a "suspect classification" ace
ing to the law as recently expounded by the U. S. Supreme Court.
The U. S. Supreme Court has listed those classifications which itr
gards as suspect.

They include race, McLaughton v. Florida, 379 U.S. I'

85 S, Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964), alienage, Graham v. Richardson,

r

U.S. 365, 91 S,Ct. 1848, 29 L,Ed. 534 (1971); national origin, Ogamav.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948); illigitimacy,
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31L.I
2d 768 (1972).

"Age" is not among these classifications.

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), the court gives a description ofwh•
is considered a suspect classification:
-6-
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[ I]t is clear that appellant's suit asks that court to review
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diyprse, and amorphous class, unified in districts that happen
to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system
of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none
of the traditional indicia of suspectness; the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful inequal treatment or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. Id at 28.
Older individuals are not "subject to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment" as are blacks, American Indians or Asian-Americans.

They have

not been denied the right to vote, nor excluded from the political process in any
way.

One need only look to the median age of the various legislative, executive,

and judicial branches of the state and national government to see that older persons are not in such a position of "political powerlessness" that the court must
look with "strict judicial scrutiny" at any action which tends to classify the older'
person differently than others.
The most recent U. S. Supreme Court decision looking into this matter
is Massachusetts Board of Retirement, et al v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct.
2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976) (hereinafter Murgia) which dealt with a Massachusetts statute requiring the retirement of all state troopers over 50 years of age.
Mr. Murgia asserted that this constituted state action in violation to his rights
guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause.
11

He asserted that age was a

•
suspect classification II and demanded the court examme
wt"th

the statute.

The Supreme Court disagreed with him.

II

s tr•lC t scru t•myII

In a per curium decision,

the court held:
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the state's resolution to competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our case under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict judie ial scrutiny". (at 314)
The reason for the court's refusal to apply the strict scrutiny stan:
in this case was that it did not find age to be a suspect classification. As!
at 313:
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be said to
discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it draws
a line at a certain age in middle life. But even old age
does not define a "discrete and insular" group, United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153,
N.Y. (1938), in need of 'extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian process". Instead, it works a stage that
each of us will reach if we live out our normal span. Even
if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class
defined as aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently
akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call
for strict judie ial scrutiny.
Several state and federal courts have also refused to hold age as a
classification.

This court, in Coleman v. Dept. of Employment Security<

of Review, 29 Utah 2d 326, 509 P. 2d 355 (1973) dealt with the issue ofwhe.
a section of the Employment Compensation Act (Title 35-4 UCA 1953) was
constitutional.

The Act required unemployment compensation to be reduc;

50% of any amount received by the individual under a retirement plan wher
employer and employee contributed.
offensive to equal protection,

This

5

,ction was held

not constitu'

even though obviously those who were mosi

ed by this statute were elderly persons.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Everhart v. Knebel, 424 F. Supp. 390, 394, n. 6 (D. Conn.
1976), the court said:
The plaintiffs do not and could not claim they are entitled
to a more stringent standard of review. Age does not invoke that higher level of scrutiny.
Another statement made by the court in Taxpayers Association of
Weymouth Township, Inc. v, Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d
1016 (1976) follows this reasoning in stating that age is not a "suspect" criterion.
It is not difficult to see the reasons for the court's reluctances to

hold age in the same "suspect classification" as it does, say, race. Race
is an

immutable characteristic

determined

solely by accident of birth.

While considered superficially, age is also a quality fixed at birth which
would not be changed except by the passage of time.

But the difference lies

in the fact that age and the aging process is something which has impact on
everyone.
The reasons behind classifications based upon age are entirely different than those which gave rise to racial discrimination.

In 1967. Willar

Wirtz, then Secretary of Labor, testified before a House Subcommittee investigating the need for and scope of age discrimination in legislation:
I would suggest that this kind of discrimination is entirely
different from racial discrimination, the root of racial
discrimination is pure bigotry. This is not true here.
[Maste v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1299,
1306 (E. D. Mich. 1976)]
We all pass through the various stages of life, each with its legal conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-9- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sequences.

Those under a certain age are excluded from public schools

(Montana v. School District #1 of Fergus County, 348 P. 2d 797 (Mont. l%

-

Younger persons are unable to vote or hold public office (Garent v. Bro,~n
~41F. Supp. 1187, 409U.S. 809aff'gmem. (S.D. Ohio1972);HumanR;,

-------:.::_

Partyv. Secretary of State, 370 F. Supp. 921, 414 U.S. 1058 aff'gmem,
Mich. 1973).

When closely examined, these classifications exclude from,

torial franchise persons who may be mature enough to handle the political
cisions necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of full-fledged citizenship,
these individual exclusions are tolerated.
B.

Admission to a graduate level educational program is not a fun
mental interest.

The second trigger of strict judicial scrutiny of claims arising unc
Equal Protection Clause are those touching fundamental interests.

The~.

Supreme Court has held that education is not one of these "fundamental if,
ests".

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, a!

the court said:
It is the province of this court to create substantive rights

in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution .
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization-10provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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have said, the undisputed importance of education will not
alone cause this court to depart from the usual standard
for reviewing a state's social and economic legislation.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, commented upon "fundamental
rights":
The court does not 'pick out' particular human activities,
characterize them as 'fundamental', and give them added
protection . . . Contrary, the court simply recognizes,
as it must, an established constitutional right, and give
to that right no less protection that the Constitution itself
gives. 394 U.S. at 642 (emphasis in the original)
The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to education.
The Constitution of the State of Utah extends the right to education to a
select group within the state; namely, children.

Appellant does not fall within

the benefited class.
The Legislature shall provide for the:
establishment and maintenance of a uniform system of public
schools, which shall be open to all children of the state, and
free from sectarian control. Constitution of Utah, Art. X,
Sec. 1.
Contrary to the position advanced by plaintiff-appellant, the framers did
not intend that the state's public schools be open to the entire population of the
state.

When a right was granted to the entire population of the state, terms such

as "men" (Art. I, Sec. I), "people" (Art. I, Sec. 2 & 6), "person" (Art. I, Sec. 7)
"citizens" (Art. IV, Sec. 1), are used.
at children.
Sec. 31.

Certain specific privileges were directed

Public schools were to be open to children, Art. III & IV, Art. X,
In another con text, the framers directed the legislature to
-11-
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prohibit the employment of children in underground mines:
The Legislature shall prohibit:
The employment of women, or of children under the
age of fourteen years, in underground mines. Constitution of Utah, Art. XVI, Sec. 3.
(1)

Art. III and IV and Art. X, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the State!
Utah were not intended to open the public schools to all persons.

Had thL

the intent of the framers, a term other than "children" would have beenu
describe the group.

The framers' use of the term "children" in Art.

m,

graph 4 and Art. X, Sec. 1 and elsewhere in the Constitution granted pri;
to a specific group within the population, namely children, and did not gr:
privileges to the population generally.
This court has rendered ::. similar interpretation of Art. X, Sec.
In Logan City School Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 341
this court said:
The requirement that schools must be open to all children
of the state is a prohibition against any law or rule which
would separate or divide the children of the state into classes or groups, and grant, allow, or provide one group or
class educational privileges or advantages denied another.
No child of school age, resident within the state, can be
lawfully denied admission to the schools of the state because
of race, color, location, religion, politics, or any other bar
or barrier which may be set up which would deny to such a
child equality of educational opportunities or facilities with
all other children of the state. 77 P. 2d at 350. (emphasis added
This interpretation by this court is consistent with other judicial
ments.

In the case of Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890),
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ida court said:
-The word 'children' when used irrespective of parentage,
may donate that class of persons under the age of twentyone years as distinguished from adults, but its ordinary
meaning with respect to parentage is sons and daughters,
of whatever age. 7 So. at 142 (emphasis added)
In the case of State ex rel Slinkard v. Grebe, 249 S.
App. 1952),

w.

2d 468 (Mo.

the Missouri court stated that the term "children" as used in an

education statute had reference to school age children.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia took a similar position in
Northrop, et al v. City of Richmond, 105 Va. 335, 52 S, E. 962 (1906).
To assert that the term "children" as used in Article X, Section I of the
Utah Constitution included all persons within the state would lead to an absurd
result.

All persons within the state could thus assert that they had a constitu-

tional right to attend law school or medical school, or any other public school
of the state regardless of program capacity or individual qualifications.

Such

was certainly not the framer's intent.
The term "children" as used in Article III, Paragraph 4 and Article X,
Sec. 1 does not include all residents of the state but establishes a distinct group
for which access to the state's public schools is constitutionally protected. Appellants erroneously asserts that she is included within the group.

Appellant,

therefore, has no constitutionally protected right to admission to the state's
public schools.
Neither does appellant have a right to education because it may lead to
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employment.

Employment in and of itsPlf is not a right.

Hather, individ

are protected from unjustified state interference with existing employrnen~
lationships.

See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131

Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S.

30, 34 S.Ct. 681, 58 L.Ed. 1129 (1914).

Appellant had no fundamental right to admission to the Ph.D. progr
Educational Psychology at the University of Utah.

Her complaint should, 1

fore, be examined using the "rational basis" standard.
POINT II
GIVEN THE LIMITED RESOURCE OF GRADUATE
EDUCATION IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY,
IT WAS RATIONAL AND PROPER FOR THE
RESPONDENTS TO ALLOCATE
THIS RESOURCE ON THE BASIS OF AGE
The educational resources of the state of Utah are finite.

The var

stitutions of higher education within the state receive the majority of their
tional funds through legislative appropriations.

Structuring the academic

to obtain optimal use of state funds is a difficult process, requiring the ex;
of the institution, the Board of Higher Education, the Board of Regents, ar.
Legislature.
This court has recognized the complex nature of the

decision-mak~

cess in education and has generally declined to reivew the conduct of educ<
administration acting within the scope of their duties.

In the early case ol.

v. Board of Education North Summit School District, et al, 81 Utah 51, I·
900 (1932), this court said:
-14-
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It is well established that, if the action of the board of
education is within the powers conferred upon it by the
Legislature, and pertains to a matter in which the board
is vested with authority to act, the courts will not review
the action of such a board to substitute its judgment for
that of the board as to matters within its discretion.
Security National Bank v. Bagley, supra; 24 R. C. L. 573;
Schmidt v. Blair, 203 Iowa 1016, 213 N. W. 593, McClure
v. Board of Education, 38 Cal. App. 500, 176 P. 711.
16 P. 2d at 903 (emphasis added)

This court went oo to attach a presumption of reasonableness at the acts
of school administrators performed within the scope of their authority:
The courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by
school directors in matters confided by law to their judgment,
unless there is a clear abuse of the discretion, or a violation
of law. So the courts are usually disinclined to interfere with
regulations adopted by the school boards, and they will not consider whether the regulations are wise or expedient, but merely
whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion of the board. Acting reasonably within the powers conferred, it is the province of the board of education to determine
what things are detrimental to the successful management, good
order, and discipline of the schools and the rules required to
produce these conditions. The presumption is always in favor
of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule or regulation duly
made. The reasonableness of regulations is a question of law
for the courts. 24 R. C. L. 57 5. See McQuillan, Municipal
Corps. (2d Ed,) 421; McLeod v. State ex rel Colmer, 154 Miss.
468, 122 So. 737, 63 A. L. R. 1161. 16 U 2d at 903 (emphasis
added)
This court will, therefore, not substitute its judgment for the judgment
of university administrators when said administrators are acting within their
scope of authority.

Further, a presumption of reasonableness attachs if the

questioned actions fall within the administrator's scope of authority.

Applying

this standard to the case at bar it is apparent that the lower court properly dismissed the complaint.
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University presidents are given power over admissions at their res
pective institutions:
Unless the board shall reserve to itself such action, the
president of each institution with the approval of the Institutional Council:
(5) May commit to the faculty of each institution, the
general initiation and direction of instruction and of the
examination, admission and classification of students •
Sec. 53-48-15 (5), Utah Code Ann. (1953).
The exercise of this power over admissions is presumed to be rea·
sonable, Beard v. Board of Education, (supra).
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that where state action is prest·
reasonable such action will not be easily set aside.
[The Equal Protection Clause] permits the state a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others. The Constitutional safeguard
is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequity. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it.
(McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 425-426, 81 S.Ct. 1101,
6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961) (emphasis added).
State action that is presumed correct will not be set aside "if any
of facts may be conceived to justify it".
this test.

The state action in the case at b;

The parties have stipulated that graduate education in the Edu:

-16-
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Psychology field is a limited resource.

It is not only reasonable but imperative

that respondents allocate this resource to maximize the benefits to the state.
The use of age as a factor in this allocation process is reasonable.
As put by the court of Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75. 77 (SDNY 1971)
461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied 409 U.S. 1129 (1973):
Notwithstanding the great advances in gerontology. the era
when advanced age ceases to be of some reasonable statistical
relationship to the diminshed capacity or longevity is still in
the future. It cannot be said, therefore, that age ceilings . • •
are inherently suspect, although their applications will inevitably fall unjustly in the individual case.
The amount of time in which an individual can contribute to the state because of skills and knowledge gained in the Ph. D. program in Educational Psychology is directly related to age.
projected time of contribution.

The younger the graduate. the greater the

Thus, generally speaking, the greater the time

period of contribution to the state.
For example, A and B make application to the graduate program in Educational Psychology.

A is twenty-five (25) and B is fifty (50).

expected to live to age seventy-two (72).
program.

Both A and Bare

The graduate program is a two (2) year

Upon graduation at age twenty-seven (27). A has forty-five (45) years

in which his skill and knowledge are available to the state.

At the time of B's

graduation, only nineteen (19} years are remaining in which to contribute.

In

order to achieve the optimum allocation of this limited resource so as to maximize the benefit to the state, age may be a factor in the selection process.
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The requisite facts are present to sustain respondent's action and I'
lower court properly dismissed the complaint.
CONCLUSIOi\

Age is not a suspect classification.
constitutional right to education.

I\ either does the appellant en)o:

The "rational basis" analysis is, therefor

used to examine claims alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations. There
pondents' actions are presumed correct and the "rational basis" test is saL
fied if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived to justify the actions.
limited resource of graduate education and the attendent need to efficiently
cate this resource so as to maximize the benefit

to the state justifies allo.

on the basis of age.
Respectfully submitted,
Brinton R. Burbidge
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
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